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Multiple sources, but preference for mafia 
witnesses’ statements  
3 
Pentiti describe mafia  
world “not only from  
the outside but also  
from within”  
 
Outline 
 Cosa Nostra, ’Ndrangheta and other mafia-type 
organizations 
 The centrality of honor 
 Mafia “legal orders” 
 Two challenges to mafia power (and legal orders) 
 Conclusions: two points in common and two parallels 
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Mafia v. organized crime 
 Four characteristics distinguish Cosa Nostra and 
’Ndrangheta from other organized crime actors 
1. Longevity 
2. Organizational and cultural complexity  
3. Claim to exercise a political dominion over areas of 
settlement 
4. Resulting ability to control legitimate markets 
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Cosa Nostra and ’Ndrangheta: structure  
 Both are consortia of about 150 
groups 
• Cosa Nostra has about 2,000-3,000 
ritually affiliated members 
• ‘Ndrangheta up to 10,000  
 Groups (“families”) and consortia 
have own ruling bodies 
• Unity is guaranteed by sharing of 
cultural codes and organizational 
formula >> segmentary societies 
 In other contexts “disorganized 
crime” (Reuter, 1983) prevails 
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Ruling bodies of an ’Ndrangheta  group 
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 A few other “mafia-type” organizations worldwide  
• I.e., Chinese Triads, Japanese Yakuza, American La Cosa Nostra, 
Russian thieves-in-law  
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Men of honor, honored societies 
 Mafia groups impose pre-modern, life-long “status 
contract” (Weber, 1922) on members 
• No well-defined duties or rewards 
 Initiation ceremony is rite of passage and institution: 
members become “men of honor” 
 Code of honor was long shared by broader population 
• Despite different connotations, core is self-defence 
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Status contracts also entail fraternization 
 Mafia initiation ceremony establishes ritual kinship 
• Ritual fraternization was key institution until Middle Ages 
 Mafiosi are bound  
• To consider other members as brothers  
• To subordinate all allegiances to mafia membership 
 Contracts create trust and solidarity among non-kin and 
give bosses extraordinary flexibility in short-term 
 Also generate ethical dualism and individuals’ 
deresponsibilization 
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The mafia “deal” 
 “The interests and honor of the association come 
before those of your family, parents, sisters, and 
brothers. The association is your family from now on 
and, if you commit infamità [that is, betraying or 
endangering the group], you will be punished with 
death. As you are faithful to the society, in the same 
way the society will be faithful to you and will help you 
in times of need. This oath can be broken only with 
death. Do you accept all this? Will you swear to it?” 
(Procura della Repubblica di Reggio Calabria, 1995). 
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Mafiosi (used to) take mafia initiation 
ceremony very seriously  
 Serafino Castagna, former ’Ndrangheta 
member: 
• “At the end of the meeting, I felt as if I had grown  
in stature; I was no longer a nobody, but a 
camorrista, somebody who had to respect the  
law of honor and to ensure that it was respected  
by others” (1967)  
 
 Cosa Nostra defector, Gaspare Mutolo: 
• “When I became a member, it was for me a new  
life, with new rules. For me, only Cosa Nostra 
existed” (1993) 
 
 
A precarious balance between 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
 Mafiosi usually presented as profit-maximizing 
entrepreneurs in criminological literature 
 In reality, combination of instrumental and solidary 
relationships 
 Status and fraternization contracts are source not only 
of strength but also of weakness 
• Can be imposed only on persons socialized to specific values  
• Growing contradiction between contract value system and 
mafiosi’s concrete activities 
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Truly alternative legal orders 
 Neither legal positivism nor pluralism are good starting 
points  
 Two mafia organizations  claim autonomy and self-
sufficiency of own legal orders  
• #  different from normative systems of other secondary groups 
 Mafia legal orders include both “rules of primary and 
secondary type” (Hart, 1994) 
• Rules of primary types often inspired by honor  
• Only embryonic rules of recognition and change 
• Clear rules of adjudication since 19th century 
 Differentiated set of sanctions, including shame 
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Claim to exercise political dominion 
 Mafia groups aim(ed) to impose 
legal orders also on outsiders 
 Claim political dominion over 
specific territory 
• Town, village or neighbourhood in 
larger cities 
 Mafia power long had higher 
degree of effectiveness and 
legitimacy than governments 
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Mafia dominion long accepted by state 
 “In practice, the relationships between the 
institutions and mafia took place, for many years, in 
the form of relationships between two distinct 
sovereignties: neither would attack the other, so long 
as each remained within its own boundaries. . . . The 
state attacked only when the Cosa Nostra attacked 
and after that it would go back to coexistence” 
(Parliamentary Anti-mafia Commission, 1993) 
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Contemporary manifestations  
of mafia political ambitions 
 “Tax” local productive activities 
 Mediate conflicts and guarantee property rights, if asked 
 Have allies among local politicians, control local life 
• Since 1991 over 200 city councils dismissed because of mafia 
infiltrations, including Reggio Calabria 
 Share favours with national politicians 
 Kill or intimidate “dangerous” state  
representatives 
• Cosa Nostra even involved in terrorist attacks 
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Mafia groups as proto-states 
 “Sicily’s problem is not a shortage, but a surfeit, of 
government. … If one mafia network managed to 
extend its control all over Sicily, all concerned would 
begin to describe its actions as ‘public’ rather than 
‘private,’ the national government would have to 
come to terms with it, outsiders and insiders alike 
would begin to treat its chiefs as the legitimate 
authority. It would be a government; it would 
resemble a state. With outside recognition of its 
autonomy, plus the development of differentiated 
and centralized instruments of control, it would be a 
state” (Tilly, 1988) 
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Two challenges 
 
 Declining acceptance of honor code in broader society 
as a result of modernization 
 Declining tolerance of alternative proto-states, sharp 
increase in anti-mafia repression since 1992 
• All Cosa Nostra chiefs and many ’Ndrangheta bosses captured 
• Thousands of other mafiosi also arrested and convicted 
• Many sent to very harsh special incarceration regime 
• Financial drain also very severe 
• Several state protectors also investigated and convicted 
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Giulio Andreotti: former Italian Prime 
Minister, tried but acquitted for collaboration 
with Cosa Nostra (statute of limitation 
applied until 1982) 
Salvatore Cuffaro: 
former President 
of the Region 
Sicily, sentenced 
to 7-year 
imprisonment for 
favouring Cosa 
Nostra 
Marcello Dell’Utri: former 
right-hand of Berlusconi 
and European MP of PdL, 
sentenced to 7-year 
imprisonment for 
favouring Cosa Nostra 
Silvio Berlusconi: former Prime 
Minister, accused  by several mafia 
defectors of ordering Falcone and 
Borsellino’s murders and Cosa 
Nostra’s terrorist attacks in 1993, 
but never charged 
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Two points in common  
 Momigliano’s approach:  
• Law, including mafia legal orders, is product of the society 
and culture of its time 
 
 For justice outcomes, honor is double-edged sword 
• Good in case of “levelling up” 
• Bad in case of persistence of status distinctions and 
“levelling down” 
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Two parallel developments 
 Substitution of honor with wealth as in-group 
differentiation criterion  
• Equality: “monstrous fiction” (Burke, 1790)? 
 Persistence of status differentiation and ethical/legal 
dualism vis-à-vis outsiders 
• Non- EU/US-citizen, non-human being? 
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